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LEGISLATIVE ENTRENCHMENT  
AND FEDERAL FISCAL POLICY 
MICHAEL DORAN* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
Amid concerns about government debt, the 112th Congress passed the 
Budget Control Act of 2011 to reduce the federal government’s budget deficits.1 
The law set out caps on discretionary spending for each fiscal year over the 
following decade and required sequestration of discretionary spending to enforce 
those caps.2 It thus attached specific policy consequences to specific actions (or 
inaction) by future Congresses. If, for example, Congress in 2016 exceeded the 
spending caps for that year, the sequestration prescribed five years earlier would 
take hold. But succeeding Congresses chafed under the strictures. With 
considerable self-congratulation, the 113th Congress relaxed the spending caps 
for fiscal years 2014 and 2015 in the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013, the 114th 
Congress relaxed the spending caps for fiscal years 2016 and 2017 in the 
Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015, and the 115th Congress did the same for fiscal 
years 2018 and 2019 in the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018.3 Those developments 
surprised few close observers of the federal budget process. The idea that a later 
Congress would adhere to significant spending caps enacted by an earlier 
Congress seemed fanciful from the start. 
But what if the 112th Congress had not simply set out specific policy 
consequences that a later Congress could reverse but instead had purported to 
bind its successors? What if the Budget Control Act of 2011 had provided that no 
later Congress could repeal or modify the spending-cap and sequestration 
provisions? The possibility of such legislative entrenchment presents an enduring 
puzzle. For decades, legal scholars have debated whether legislative 
entrenchment is possible under the Constitution and desirable as a matter of 
policy. That debate has produced surprisingly limited insights. The aim here is to 
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        1.    Budget Control Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-25, 125 Stat. 240 (2011). 
        2.    Budget Control Act of 2011, §§ 101, 302, 125. See also BILL HENIFF, JR. ET AL., CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV.,  R41965, THE BUDGET CONTROL ACT OF 2011, at 11–14, 27–32 (2011). 
        3.    Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-123, 132 Stat. 64 (2018); Bipartisan Budget Act 
of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-74, 129 Stat. 584 (2015); Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-67, 127 
Stat. 1165 (2013); GRANT A. DRIESSEN & MARC LABONTE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42506, THE 
BUDGET CONTROL ACT OF 2011 AS AMENDED: BUDGETARY EFFECTS, at 6–7 (2015).  
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present a fresh analysis of the puzzle through a particular focus on federal fiscal 
policy. 
In general terms, legislative entrenchment is legislative action that prevents 
or hinders action by a simple majority in a subsequent legislature. The dominant 
position among legal scholars—including Charles Black, Aaron-Andrew Bruhl, 
Erwin Chemerinsky, David Dana, Julian Eule, Catherine Fisk, Paul Kahn, 
Michael Klarman, Susan Koniak, John McGinnis, Michael Rappaport, John 
Roberts, Stewart Sterk, and Laurence Tribe—holds that legislative 
entrenchment is unwise, uncommon, and unconstitutional.4 In a prominent 
criticism of that position, Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule concede that 
legislative entrenchment is rare but argue that it is nonetheless sound as a matter 
of both policy and constitutional law.5 
The two sides distinguish between what can be called “hard entrenchment” 
and what can be called “soft entrenchment.” “Hard entrenchment” is legislative 
action that strictly binds a simple majority in a subsequent legislature.6 A federal 
statute requiring Congress to enact a balanced budget and also prohibiting 
Congress from repealing or modifying the requirement, whether absolutely or by 
simple majority, would be a case of hard entrenchment (assuming the prohibition 
were effective). “Soft entrenchment,” by contrast, is legislative action that 
impedes (but does not strictly bind) a simple majority in a subsequent legislature, 
thereby making a change to the policy status quo by simple majority more 
difficult or less likely than it otherwise would be. Soft entrenchment covers a 
broad spectrum of possible legislative action. At one end, every statute 
entrenches a policy outcome simply by setting that outcome as the status quo. A 
budget passed by Congress for a subsequent fiscal year is at least modestly 
entrenched because any change must overcome a legislative bias favoring the 
status quo. At the other end, the Senate filibuster and the Senate rule that 
nominally protects the filibuster entrench the status quo to a much greater extent; 
 
  4. See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 2–3 125 n.1 (2000); 
Charles L. Black, Jr., Amending the Constitution: A Letter to a Congressman, 82 YALE L.J. 189 (1972); 
Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Using Statutes to Set Legislative Rules: Entrenchment, Separation of Powers, and 
the Rules of Proceedings Clause, 19 J.L. & POL. 345 (2003); David Dana & Susan P. Koniak, Bargaining 
in the Shadow of Democracy, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 473 (1999); Julian E. Eule, Temporal Limits on the 
Legislative Mandate: Entrenchment and Retroactivity, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 379 (1987); Catherine 
Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Filibuster, 49 STAN. L. REV. 181 (1997); Paul W. Kahn, Gramm-Rudman 
and the Capacity of Congress to Control the Future, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 185 (1986); Michael J. 
Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial Review: The Entrenchment Problem, 85 GEO. L.J. 491 (1997); John O. 
McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Symmetric Entrenchment: A Constitutional and Normative Theory, 
89 VA. L. REV. 385 (2003) [hereinafter McGinnis & Rappaport I]; John O. McGinnis & Michael B. 
Rappaport, The Constitutionality of Legislative Supermajority Requirements: A Defense, 105 YALE L.J. 
483 (1995) [hereinafter McGinnis & Rappaport II]; John C. Roberts & Erwin Chemerinsky, 
Entrenchment of Ordinary Legislation: A Reply to Professors Posner and Vermeule, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1773 
(2003) [hereinafter Roberts & Chemerinsky]; Stewart E. Sterk, Retrenchment on Entrenchment, 71 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 231 (2003). 
 5.  Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Legislative Entrenchment: A Reappraisal, 111 YALE L.J. 
1665, 1666 (2002). 
 6.  Admittedly, bindingness is an ambiguous concept, but as H.L.A. Hart maintained, it is “familiar 
to lawyers and tolerably clear in meaning.” H.L.A. Hart, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 216 (2d ed. 1994). 
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defeating a filibuster requires either a supermajority coalition to invoke cloture 
or a majority agreement to amend the standing rules of the Senate. Soft 
entrenchment might require a subsequent majority to navigate additional 
obstacles, but it ultimately does not prevent a subsequent majority from acting. 
Note that, as the term is used here, legislative entrenchment is legislative 
action that either strictly binds or impedes a simple majority in a subsequent 
legislature. This implies three important points. First, legislative entrenchment 
requires legislative action and therefore excludes structural features of the 
legislative process imposed by the Constitution.7 The veto power and the 
requirement of bicameralism and presentment, for example, undoubtedly 
entrench the status quo,8 but they do not constitute legislative entrenchment 
because they are not endogenous to the legislature. Congress cannot change 
those features of the legislative process. Second, legislative entrenchment binds 
or impedes a simple majority in a subsequent legislature. Every legislature must 
start somewhere, and the starting point, in the absence of a contrary 
constitutional mandate, is simple majoritarianism. A legislature may adopt 
supermajority requirements as part of its internal structure, such as the 
suspension-of-the-rules procedure in the House (which requires a two-thirds 
majority) or the filibuster in the Senate (which requires a three-fifths majority). 
But such structures are themselves subject to revision, and the bedrock principle 
for institutional change is simple majoritarianism. Third, legislative 
entrenchment affects a simple majority in a subsequent legislature. Action by any 
Congress to bind or impede itself during its two-year constitutional term may 
present interesting questions, but it does not present the problem of legislative 
entrenchment. 
The conventional academic analysis focuses almost exclusively on hard 
entrenchment; scholars generally consider soft entrenchment unimportant and 
uninteresting. That approach leads to analytic dead ends. The two sides debate 
whether hard entrenchment is constitutional and, separately, whether it makes 
for good policy. Those controversies are not easily resolved. The constitutional 
analysis is problematic, with superficially persuasive arguments for and against 
hard entrenchment falling apart on close examination. The policy analysis forces 
a seemingly unavoidable choice between flexibility and commitment, both of 
which can be attractive attributes of legislative action. But there is also a certain 
pointlessness to those controversies. Hard entrenchment in federal statutory law 
may not exist at all, and it probably is not even structurally possible. With so little 
 
 7.  It also excludes governmental action through contracting and property conveyancing. Cf. 
Christopher Serkin, Public Entrenchment through Private Law: Binding Local Governments, 78 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 879, 889–892 (2011) (analyzing how governments avoid anti-entrenchment rules by using private 
law mechanisms to make binding precommitments). 
 8.  See generally Michael D. Gilbert, Entrenchment, Incrementalism, and Constitutional Collapse, 
103 VA. L. REV. 631 (2017); Michael D. Gilbert, Optimal Entrenchment of Legal Rules (Univ. of Va., 
Law & Economics Research Paper No. 2017-10, 2017, Law & Legal Theory Research Paper No. 2017-
25, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2970164 [https://perma.cc/AT6L-
DHZU]. 
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at stake, the conventional analysis of hard entrenchment quickly devolves into an 
academic parlor game. 
Soft entrenchment, however, presents entirely different considerations. 
Although largely ignored by the conventional analysis, soft entrenchment is 
commonplace. Even if an earlier Congress does not strictly bind a simple majority 
in a later Congress, the earlier Congress can make it more or less difficult for a 
simple majority in a later Congress to change policy outcomes. The earlier 
Congress might embed in a particular statute a provision that purports to insulate 
the statute from repeal or modification, thereby making a later Congress at the 
least override the anti-repeal or anti-modification provision. The earlier 
Congress might also design its internal structure and procedures in a way that 
makes it more difficult to change the policy status quo, such as by setting up 
committees that are not representative of the full House or Senate. Such 
legislative actions have entrenching effects, and once one turns to these, the 
entrenchment landscape looks very different. What formerly seemed uncommon, 
unwise, and unconstitutional reveals itself to be universal, unavoidable, and 
constitutionally unremarkable. 
Soft entrenchment is of two general types. In the first, which can be called 
“deliberate soft entrenchment,” Congress enacts statutes and adopts rules for the 
specific purpose of entrenching the status quo. The Budget Control Act of 2011 
is a case of deliberate soft entrenchment. By establishing caps on discretionary 
spending for future years and setting sequestration as the enforcement 
mechanism for those caps, the 112th Congress did not actually bind its successors; 
it did not even purport to bind its successors. But the 112th Congress intended to 
impede majorities in future Congresses by requiring that those majorities 
affirmatively suspend sequestration in order to spend in excess of the caps. 
Ultimately, deliberate soft entrenchment binds a later Congress only to the 
extent that the later Congress chooses to treat itself as bound. In the case of the 
Budget Control Act of 2011, later Congresses have chosen to treat themselves as 
bound very loosely, if at all, by the 112th Congress. 
In the second type of soft entrenchment, which can be called “incidental soft 
entrenchment,” Congress enacts statutes and adopts rules for the general 
purpose of organizing itself and its activities. The House and the Senate have 
numerous internal rules, norms, and practices that systematically, although 
generally unintentionally, entrench the status quo. The distribution of agenda-
setting power among chamber leaders and standing committees, the 
establishment of numerous veto gates, the formal and informal barriers to floor 
amendments, the rules of debate, and the mechanisms for resolving inter-
chamber differences all anchor existing policy to some degree. These procedures 
are strictly necessary for the legislature to function. Institutions based on majority 
rule, such as Congress, require organizational structures to stabilize policy 
outcomes, and soft entrenchment is an inevitable consequence of these 
structures. Because it specifically authorizes the House and the Senate to 
determine their own rules of proceeding, the Constitution cannot be read to bar 
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such entrenchment. 
The incidental soft entrenchment attributable to legislative organizational 
structures is significant in the fiscal-policy setting. The annual federal budget 
process, which culminates in the enactment of twelve appropriations bills and 
numerous authorization bills, is thick with institutional obstacles that frustrate 
changes to the policy status quo. Often, the outcome is the enactment of one or 
more continuing resolutions that carry forward existing budget policy with little 
or no change. Additionally, large portions of fiscal policy—including major 
social-welfare entitlements and tax expenditures—are beyond the reach of the 
annual budget process. Revisions to social-welfare entitlements and tax 
expenditures must overcome all the internal institutional obstacles that generally 
hinder affirmative legislation action. Not surprisingly, entitlement and tax reform 
occur very rarely. 
Those who prefer greater flexibility in federal fiscal policy—potentially giving 
Congress more latitude to reduce deficit spending, reform entitlements, and 
repeal tax preferences—must contend with the problem of incidental soft 
entrenchment. Fiscal policy is entrenched in part because of legislative 
organizational structures. But weakening those structures in order to dis-
entrench fiscal policy would be costly. Specifically, it would undermine legislative 
stability, degrade the quality of legislative information, and frustrate legislative 
dealmaking. As with so many policy problems, there are trade-offs to be made. 
The argument proceeds as follows. Part II examines the existing academic 
debate about hard entrenchment and argues that hard entrenchment is highly 
improbable. Part III examines soft entrenchment and explains further the 
distinction between deliberate soft entrenchment and incidental soft 
entrenchment. Part IV examines the place of incidental soft entrenchment in 
federal fiscal policy. The part argues that, for better or worse, incidental soft 
entrenchment brings meaningful stability to budget policy, social-welfare 
entitlements, and tax expenditures. It also argues that introducing greater 
flexibility by reducing incidental soft entrenchment would involve trade-offs on 
institutional design and could compromise the quality of fiscal policy legislation. 
II 
HARD ENTRENCHMENT 
The conventional analysis of legislative entrenchment breaks into two sharply 
divided positions. The longstanding consensus, articulated more than fifty years 
ago by Charles Black, holds that legislative entrenchment is something that, “on 
the most familiar and fundamental principles, so obvious as rarely to be stated, 
no Congress for the time being can do.”9 The claimed obviousness 
notwithstanding, many legal scholars have detailed their objections to 
entrenchment.10 In 2002, Posner and Vermeule challenged the consensus, arguing 
 
 9.  Black, supra note 4, at 191.  
 10.  See supra note 4.  
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that “legislatures should be allowed to bind their successors” and that, in any 
event, “entrenchment is . . . constitutionally permissible.”11 
Both sides distinguish between hard entrenchment and soft entrenchment, 
although they do not use those terms. For the most part, scholars consider only 
the former to constitute actual entrenchment. Posner and Vermeule define 
“entrenchment” as “the enactment of either statutes or internal legislative rules 
that are binding against subsequent legislative action in the same form.”12 Fisk 
and Chemerinsky also argue that a statute or legislative rule constitutes 
entrenchment if it “binds” future legislatures.13 Dana and Koniak define 
“legislative entrenchment” as “a legal hierarchy in which the will of a past 
legislature trumps the will of a present legislature.”14 And Eule describes 
entrenchment as “[a] legislature . . . inalterably dictat[ing] the future.”15 Both 
sides recognize that every legislative act has future consequences, and both sides 
recognize that, for reasons internal and external to Congress, it often is difficult 
for a legislative majority to work its will. But the conventional analysis considers 
those points to be qualitatively different.16 When they talk about entrenchment, 
legal scholars generally refer to hard entrenchment.17 
Scholars debate hard entrenchment, but that does not mean that it deserves 
the attention. The concept itself is problematic. H.L.A. Hart, in considering the 
consensus position that one Parliament cannot strictly bind a successor 
Parliament, said that “no necessity of logic, still less of nature, dictates” that 
 
 11.  Posner & Vermeule, supra note 5, at 1666. 
 12.  Posner & Vermeule, supra note 5, at 1667 (emphasis added). See also Bruhl, supra note 4, at 
373; Roberts & Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at 1777–78. 
 13.  Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at 250, 253. 
 14.  Dana & Koniak, supra note 4, at 529 (emphasis added). 
 15.  Eule, supra note 4, at 381 (emphasis added). Although Eule distinguishes between what he calls 
“absolute entrenchment” and other forms of entrenchment, all his entrenchment forms assume that a 
legislature prohibits certain actions by a simple majority in a subsequent legislature. Specifically, Eule 
categorizes entrenchment as “absolute,” “procedural,” “transitory,” and “preconditional.” He defines 
“absolute entrenchment” as entrenchment that denies a subsequent legislature the power to repeal a 
statute “for all time, under any conditions, and by whatever procedure.” He says that procedural 
entrenchment “entails an attempt not to bind the future irrevocably, but to prescribe the ‘manner and 
form’ by which the promulgated directives can be changed,” that transitory entrenchment “seeks to 
prevent alteration for a specified period of time only,” and that preconditional entrenchment “purports 
to permit change only on the occurrence of a preordained event.” Id. at 384–85. Thus, even the three 
non-absolute forms of entrenchment do more than simply impede action by a legislative majority: within 
their terms, they purport to prohibit majority action. See id. at 384 n.14. 
 16.  See, e.g., Klarman, supra note 4, at 504–05; Roberts & Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at 1778, 1814–
18; Sterk, supra note 4, at 232. Dana and Koniak flatly state that such effects of legislative acts should not 
be considered entrenchment. Dana & Koniak, supra note 4, at 530–31. But see Posner & Vermeule, supra 
note 5, at 1767 (arguing that legislative “policy choices become entrenched de facto through path 
dependence and inertia”) (emphasis added). Even Posner and Vermeule, however, do not consider 
legislative inertia to constitute entrenchment. Id. at 1696–97. 
 17.  Klarman uses the term “legislative entrenchment” to refer to “the so-called agency problem of 
representative government—elected representatives discounting their constituents’ preferences in 
furtherance of their own perpetuation in office.” Klarman, supra note 4, at 502. By contrast, he uses the 
term “cross-temporal entrenchment” to refer to the problem of a legislature binding the majority of a 
subsequent legislature. Id. at 504.  
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outcome; rather, “it is only one arrangement among others, equally conceivable, 
which has come to be accepted with us as the criterion of legal validity.”18 Hart 
exactly captures the threshold inquiry. A legal system may allow hard 
entrenchment, but it is a separate question whether any particular legal system 
does allow it. 
In the United States, the constitutional framework for federal legislation 
effectively precludes the possibility of hard entrenchment. The Rules of 
Proceedings Clause, which provides that “[e]ach House may determine the rules 
of its Proceedings,” makes Congress the final arbiter of its own procedures.19 
Congress—and only Congress—determines whether a legislative measure has 
been validly enacted.20 As a practical matter, a later Congress cannot be bound 
by an ostensibly hard-entrenching statute or rule from an earlier Congress 
because any legislative action by the later Congress inconsistent with that statute 
or rule would be self-validating under the Rules of Proceedings Clause. In other 
words, the decision of the later Congress to ignore the ostensibly hard-
entrenching statue or rule from the earlier Congress would have the force of law 
as long as the later Congress says that it has the force of law. Any “binding” effect 
of what purports to be hard entrenchment derives solely from a decision of a later 
Congress to treat itself as though it were bound by the action of the earlier 
Congress rather than from the action of the earlier Congress. 
Consistent with that, scholars have struggled to identify meaningful examples 
of hard entrenchment in federal legislation. Eule notes that instances of 
entrenchment “are rare indeed.”21 Posner and Vermeule agree.22 Eule cites only 
two examples: an “attempt by [the] Ohio legislature to permanently establish the 
county seat of Mahoning County at Canfield” and an authorization by the 67th 
Congress that a “committee investigation . . . continue until the end of the 68th 
Congress.”23 Posner and Vermeule also cite the Mahoning County example and 
 
 18.  Hart, supra note 6, at 149. Cf. LON L. FULLER, THE LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF 35–36 (1940) 
(considering various arrangements of limitation on sovereign authority).  
 19.  John C. Roberts, Are Congressional Committees Constitutional? Radical Textualism, Separation 
of Powers, and the Enactment Process, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 489, 530–42 (2001). See also Roberts & 
Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at 1793.  
 20.  Roberts, supra note 19, at 542. In United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 5 (1892), the Supreme 
Court indicated that, subject to three specific limitations, the power of each chamber of Congress under 
the Rules of Proceedings Clause is “absolute and beyond the challenge of any other body or tribunal.” 
The limitations are: (1) that the House or the Senate may not use the Rules of Proceedings Clause to 
“ignore constitutional restraints” (such as the constitutional requirement of a two-thirds vote in the 
Senate to convict the president in impeachment proceedings); (2) that the House or the Senate may not 
use the Rules of Proceedings Clause to “violate fundamental rights”; and (3) that any rule of the House 
or the Senate must have a “reasonable relation” to the “result which is sought to be attained.” Although 
those limitations might invalidate a congressional rule in a specific case (for example, if the House 
adopted a rule requiring that all legislation promote the establishment of the Episcopal Church as the 
official religion of the United States), none of those limitations categorically implicates the exclusive 
authority of Congress to determine what legislative action has the force of law. 
 21.  Eule, supra note 4, at 406.  
 22.  Posner & Vermeule, supra note 5, at 1693.  
 23.  Eule, supra note 4, at 406 n.122.  
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“the federal statute at issue in Reichelderfer v. Quinn, which ‘perpetually 
dedicated’ certain public lands in the capital for use as Rock Creek Park.”24 One 
of these involves a state statute, and the other has not been tested by a subsequent 
congressional majority. Fisk, Chemerinsky, Posner, and Vermeule consider the 
two-thirds supermajority requirement for changing the Senate cloture rule to 
constitute entrenchment.25 But that view is not correct.26 At the very least, then, 
congressional hard entrenchment is extraordinarily rare; the better view is that it 
simply does not exist. 
The dubious status of hard entrenchment in federal legislation raises the 
possibility that the conventional analysis, however interesting and sophisticated, 
is pointless. Although theoretically possible, hard entrenchment in federal 
legislation is highly improbable as a matter of process and structure. One might 
suppose that the conventional analysis nonetheless yields meaningful insights. 
Perhaps by mooting what amounts to an elaborate hypothetical question about 
hard entrenchment, the conventional analysis reaches constitutional and policy 
answers about soft entrenchment. But that optimism proves misplaced. On both 
constitutional and policy considerations, the focus on hard entrenchment leads 
to blind alleys. 
A. Constitutional Analysis 
Opponents and proponents of hard entrenchment have debated its 
constitutional status at length, but their analyses provide little meaningful 
guidance. Consider first the textual arguments against entrenchment.27 No 
provision in the Constitution expressly permits or prohibits legislative 
entrenchment, so both sides have searched for indirect textual support. Roberts 
and Chemerinsky argue that the Rules of Proceedings Clause provides “the best 
constitutional basis for arguing that legislative entrenchment is not permitted by 
our Constitution.”28 The clause, they correctly note, makes the House and the 
Senate largely sovereign over their internal affairs.29 Roberts and Chemerinsky 
then assert that the clause “guarantee[s] that each Congress over time will 
exercise equal plenary authority over its enactment process.”30 If legislative 
entrenchment were permissible, they argue, an earlier Congress (which they call 
“Congress One”) would effectively “overturn” the Rules of Proceedings Clause 
 
 24.  Posner & Vermeule, supra note 5, at 1667. See also Bruhl, supra note 4, at 374.  
 25.  Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at 245–52; Posner & Vermeule, supra note 5, at 1694–95. But 
see Roberts & Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at 1780 n.20. 
 26.  See infra Part III.A. In a final effort to identify entrenchment examples, Posner and Vermeule 
point to statutory rules of statutory interpretation as “partially entrenched”—that is, as “[i]ntermediate 
between . . . genuine entrenchment . . . and . . . pseudo-entrenchment.” Posner & Vermeule, supra note 
5, at 1697–98. 
 27.  Although not exhaustive, the arguments considered here are the more plausible ones put forth 
in the conventional analysis.  
 28.  Roberts & Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at 1789.  
 29.  Id. at 1793.  
 30.  Id. at 1794 (emphasis in original). 
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with respect to a later Congress (which they call “Congress Two”).31 They 
conclude that the Rules of Proceedings Clause “guarantees that both Congress 
One and Congress Two will have the full authority to structure their proceedings 
as they see fit.”32 
Their argument works only by assuming the point to be proven.33 The Rules 
of Proceedings Clause simply does not say how it applies over time. Consider two 
readings of the clause: first, each chamber of Congress can adopt rules of 
proceeding that bind that chamber only for one Congress; second, each chamber 
of Congress can adopt rules of proceeding that bind that chamber for more than 
one Congress.34 On the first reading, it would violate the Rules of Proceedings 
Clause if the House or the Senate were to impose a supermajority requirement 
for legislative action by a subsequent House or Senate. On the second reading, it 
would violate the Rules of Proceedings Clause if the House or the Senate were 
unable to impose a supermajority requirement on a subsequent House or Senate. 
The question is whether the rulemaking authority of an earlier Congress is 
limited by the rulemaking authority of a later Congress (the first reading), or 
whether the rulemaking authority of the later Congress is limited by the 
rulemaking authority of the earlier Congress (the second reading). 
Nothing in the Rules of Proceedings Clause favors one reading over the other; 
both are fully consistent with the text. Roberts and Chemerinsky arbitrarily 
choose the first. They assume that every later Congress must have the same 
power under the Rules of Proceedings Clause that every earlier Congress has. 
From there, they reason that, unless the first reading is correct, it would not be 
the case that “each Congress over time will exercise plenary authority over its 
enactment process.”35 But whether “each Congress over time” does or does not 
 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  Id. at 1795 (emphasis in original). 
 33.  It is important to distinguish the argument that Roberts and Chemerinsky make from the 
argument above (at pages 33–34) about the Rules of Proceedings Clause. Roberts and Chemerinsky 
argue that the clause prohibits hard entrenchment—that hard entrenchment is unconstitutional because 
it violates the clause. The argument above is that, whether or not hard entrenchment is constitutionally 
permissible, the exclusive authority of Congress under the clause to determine whether an act of 
Congress has the force of law precludes hard entrenchment as a practical matter. The difference between 
the two arguments is the difference between saying that hard entrenchment is invalid (the Roberts and 
Chemerinsky argument) and saying that hard entrenchment is without effect (the argument above). 
 34.  A third reading—that neither chamber of Congress can adopt rules of proceeding that bind that 
chamber even for one Congress—does not engage the question of legislative entrenchment. As such, it 
is not distinct from the first reading for these purposes. 
 35.  Roberts & Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at 1794 (emphasis in original). Roberts and Chemerinsky 
claim support for their assumption from a passage in United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 5 (1892), in which 
the Supreme Court refused to overturn a determination by the House that its quorum requirement had 
been satisfied. The Court, in describing the Rules of Proceedings Clause, said that “[t]he power to make 
rules is not one which once exercised is exhausted. It is a continuous power, always subject to be exercised 
by the house, and within the limitations suggested, absolute and beyond the challenge of any other body 
or tribunal.” Id. See also Roberts & Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at 1794. Roberts and Chemerinsky read 
too much into this. The passage says that an exercise of rulemaking power by Congress does not forfeit 
the rulemaking power of a future Congress. It does not say that an exercise of rulemaking power by 
Congress may not bind a future Congress. Reading the passage as making the second point renders it 
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“exercise plenary authority over its enactment process” is exactly the question 
that Roberts and Chemerinsky were supposed to answer. Once the circularity is 
set aside, the analysis returns to the starting point: The Rules of Proceedings 
Clause does not say whether each chamber may adopt rules that bind that 
chamber across time or whether each chamber may bind itself only for a single 
Congress. The clause poses the question, but it does not provide the answer.36 
The non-textual arguments against legislative entrenchment are also 
unsatisfactory.37 The most prominent of these maintains that legislative 
entrenchment violates the constitutional principle of majoritarianism. Different 
scholars make the argument in different terms, but the basic structure is the same: 
Entrenchment by one Congress, which is elected to represent a particular 
majority of voters, prohibits the exercise of equal sovereignty by a later majority 
of voters.38 Paul Kahn puts the point this way: “Legislatures . . . may not try 
directly to control future legislatures. To do so is to assert authority where there 
is none. It is to transgress on the shadowy concept of popular sovereignty which 
remains always inalienable and complete.”39 In other words, legislative 
entrenchment intrudes on the sovereignty of popular majorities across time in 
the same way that (per Roberts and Chemerinsky) it intrudes on the rulemaking 
power of Congress across time. 
Again, the argument is not persuasive. First, the general appeal to 
majoritarianism is not dispositive because the Constitution promotes 
majoritarianism at certain points, such as representation in the House, and flatly 
impedes it at other points, such as representation in the Senate. The incomplete 
and imperfect commitment to majoritarianism provides no guidance on questions 
that the constitutional text itself does not address. Second, the argument has the 
question-begging problem seen in the Roberts and Chemerinsky argument under 
the Rules of Proceedings Clause. The complete authority that Kahn and others 
 
incoherent. If the rules of an earlier Congress can bind a future Congress, the rulemaking power is not 
“absolute” at all times. But if the rules of an earlier Congress cannot bind a future Congress, the 
rulemaking power still is not “absolute” at all times. Again, either the rulemaking power of the earlier 
Congress must yield to the rulemaking power of the later Congress or the rulemaking power of the later 
Congress must yield to the rulemaking power of the earlier Congress. The Ballin passage does not answer 
that question. 
 36.  See also McGinnis & Rappaport II, supra note 4, at 504. Chemerinsky in an earlier article had 
taken the position that the Rules of Proceedings Clause “is silent as to timing” and, thus, could not be 
used as textual support for the unconstitutionality of legislative entrenchment. See Fisk & Chemerinsky, 
supra note 4, at 246. 
 37.  As with the textual arguments, the argument set forth in this section is not exhaustive of the 
non-textual arguments made in the conventional analysis. For example, Fisk and Chemerinsky cite a 
handful of Supreme Court decisions to conclude that “entrenchment . . . violates a fundamental 
constitutional principle: One legislature cannot bind subsequent legislatures.” Fisk & Chemerinsky, 
supra note 4, at 247–48. Of course, their argument then stands or falls with the correctness of the cases, 
but they generally do not go behind the decisions. See also Virginia A. Seitz & Joseph R. Guerra, A 
Constitutional Defense of “Entrenched” Senate Rules Governing Debate, 20 J.L. & POL. 1, 22–24 (2004). 
 38.  See, e.g., Dana & Koniak, supra note 4, at 531–36; Eule, supra note 4, at 394–406; Klarman, supra 
note 4, at 499–501; McGinnis & Rappaport II, supra note 4, at 505–07.  
 39.  Kahn, supra note 4, at 231. 
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argue is held by each temporal majority is necessarily ambiguous. If an earlier 
majority binds a later majority, it is clear that the authority of the later majority 
is not “inalienable and complete” (to use Kahn’s phrase). But if the earlier 
majority is unable to bind the later majority, it is clear that the authority of the 
earlier majority is not “inalienable and complete” either. The question is whether 
the principle of majoritarianism privileges the earlier majority or the later 
majority. Simply pointing out that legislative entrenchment allows an earlier 
majority to trump a later majority identifies the problem, but it does not answer 
it.40 
Posner and Vermeule correctly point out that no provision in the Constitution 
expressly prohibits legislative entrenchment. Yet they can identify no provision 
that expressly permits it. Posner and Vermeule suggest that the power to 
entrench may be part of the Vesting Clause, under which “[a]ll legislative Powers 
herein granted” are vested in Congress. They reason that the Constitution does 
not specifically forbid entrenchment—in contrast, for example, to the specific 
prohibition on enacting an ex post facto law. That argument is weak. For the 
argument to succeed, “[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted” would have to 
encompass all possible legislative power. In other words, Article I would have to 
begin with comprehensive legislative power and then specifically exclude certain 
specific powers, such as the power to enact an ex post facto law. That position is 
inconsistent with the enumeration of congressional powers set forth in Article I, 
Section 8.41 
Posner and Vermeule also argue that the constitutional entrenchment 
effected by Article V supports legislative entrenchment by analogy.42 Article V 
imposes a supermajority requirement on Congress and the states for all 
constitutional amendments and a unanimity requirement on the states for any 
constitutional amendment changing representation in the Senate. Certainly, as 
Posner and Vermeule argue, the constitutional entrenchment in Article V is a 
plain indication that the Constitution tolerates entrenchment in specific cases; 
and, certainly, as they argue, the constitutional entrenchment in Article V is a 
plain indication that the Founders thought about entrenchment. But the 
provision for constitutional entrenchment under Article V indicates nothing 
about the status of legislative entrenchment.43 
 
 40.  Cf. Hart, supra note 6, at 149–50 (“These two conceptions of [Parliamentary] omnipotence have 
their parallel in two conceptions of an omnipotent God: on the one hand, a God who at every moment 
of his existence enjoys the same powers and so is incapable of cutting down those powers, and, on the 
other, a God whose powers include the power to destroy for the future his omnipotence.”). 
 41.  Posner and Vermeule themselves do not appear to put much stock in the argument. They note 
that the Vesting Clause does not address “how the legislative power, whatever that power encompasses, 
is allocated over time to successive Congresses.” Posner & Vermeule, supra note 5, at 1674. 
 42.  Id. at 1681–82. 
 43.  Cf. McGinnis & Rappaport I, supra note 4, at 395 (“[T]he distinction between constitutional and 
ordinary legislation is fundamental in our system, and entrenchment flouts that distinction.”). For the 
same reason, the Article V argument does not support the conclusion that legislative entrenchment is 
unconstitutional. 
DORAN_PAGINATED (DO NOT DELETE) 5/3/2018 2:16 PM 
38 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 81:27 
B. Policy Analysis 
The policy analysis of hard entrenchment has not been much more productive 
than the constitutional analysis. The most compelling arguments made for and 
against hard entrenchment pit the desirability of governmental flexibility against 
the desirability of governmental pre-commitment.44 Opponents argue that hard 
entrenchment necessarily reduces policy flexibility, thereby obstructing the 
capacity of future legislators to work their will. Eule argues that, by transferring 
authority from later to earlier legislative majorities, entrenchment “prevents 
those with the greatest knowledge of societal needs from acting.”45 Roberts and 
Chemerinsky find legislative entrenchment “dangerous” because it magnifies the 
effects of “temporary radical majorities” in the legislature, diminishes legislative 
responsiveness to “changing national consensus,” and inhibits legal reform for 
“changing social and economic conditions.”46 “Good government,” they argue, 
“requires that each legislature and each public majority reassess the need for new 
policies.”47 
Proponents reply that legislative entrenchment facilitates long-term 
governmental commitments and precludes the possibility of post hoc 
opportunism by future legislative majorities. Posner and Vermeule argue that 
“[e]ntrenchment enables a government to make a credible pre-commitment that 
it will not hold up a person (or firm or institution or country) from whom it seeks 
certain actions.”48 This, they point out, reduces the costs of governmental action.49 
Additionally, the proponents argue, entrenchment helps legislators commit 
among themselves to resist interest-group pressure. McGinnis and Rappaport 
point to the House supermajority requirement for tax-rate increases as “a modest 
precommitment by the majority not to go down a road that will make everyone 
worse off in the end as concentrated interest groups demand expenditures that 
beggar the nation as a whole.”50 In effect, entrenchment proponents maintain that 
the interests of present and future majorities can be served by a present majority’s 
decision to alienate legislative policy flexibility. 
The preoccupation with hard entrenchment has led scholars to frame the 
policy analysis as a sharp choice between governmental policy flexibility and 
governmental pre-commitment. Hard entrenchment involves policy outcomes 
enacted at one time that cannot be readily changed at a later time, and it 
therefore suggests, as a normative matter, a dichotomy between the flexibility to 
revise those outcomes and the capacity of government credibly to bind itself 
 
 44.  There are other normative arguments for and against legislative entrenchment. See, e.g., Eule, 
supra note 4, at 387–88; Sterk, supra note 4, at 237–40. 
 45.  Eule, supra note 4, at 387. See also Sterk, supra note 4, at 240–44. 
 46.  Roberts & Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at 1809–12. 
 47.  Id. at 1813. 
 48.  Posner & Vermeule, supra note 5, at 1670. 
 49.  Id. 
 50.  McGinnis & Rappaport II, supra note 4, at 510. See also Posner & Vermeule, supra note 5, at 
1671. 
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against the possibility of such revision. But here the conventional analysis 
effectively backs itself into a corner. Obviously, there are advantages both to 
governmental policy flexibility and to governmental pre-commitment. Neither is 
always superior or preferable to the other, and it is not necessary that Congress 
pursue one to the exclusion of the other. Whether flexibility trumps pre-
commitment or pre-commitment trumps flexibility depends on the specific 
considerations presented by a particular question. There is much to be said for 
pre-commitment when the government sells its debt in the bond markets; a 
credible pledge against repudiation of the debt reduces the government’s 
borrowing cost. By contrast, policy flexibility seems particularly desirable when 
government attempts to act in areas that are sensitive to changing conditions, 
such as national security. The conventional analysis thus fails to justify a 
compelling policy position on legislative entrenchment. Although flexibility and 
pre-commitment are important bases for assessing the stability of legislative 
outcomes, the sharp dichotomy between them is neither necessary nor desirable. 
III 
SOFT ENTRENCHMENT 
Hard entrenchment is highly unlikely, perhaps even structurally impossible. 
But soft entrenchment is commonplace and, in fact, unavoidable. Congress 
occasionally enacts statutes and adopts legislative rules for their entrenching 
effects. Although they fall short of hard entrenchment, these statutes and rules 
anchor the status quo to varying degrees. But still more interesting and more 
important are the incidental entrenching effects of the basic structures and 
processes of legislative organization. Every legislative body requires 
organizational structures and processes to function, and they erect obstacles to 
changing the policy status quo. The soft but ubiquitous entrenching effects of 
legislative organization matter considerably more than the hard but hypothetical 
entrenching effects that dominate the academic debate. In short, legal scholars 
have missed the real significance of legislative entrenchment. 
A. Deliberate Soft Entrenchment 
The conventional analysis is not wrong to assume that one Congress may try 
to prevent a future Congress from repealing or modifying a statute. But 
entrenchment in practice is best understood as a continuum. Few scholars 
recognize this point. Daryl Levinson argues that “formal, legal” entrenchment “is 
clearly a matter of degree.”51 Posner and Vermeule note that different federal 
statutes and legislative rules may effect different degrees of entrenchment, 
although they argue that statutes and rules not strictly binding on a successor 
Congress do not really count as entrenchment.52 The relevant question is not 
 
 51.  Daryl J. Levinson, Parchment and Politics: The Positive Puzzle of Constitutional Commitment, 
124 HARV. L. REV. 657, 697 n.128 (2011). See also Daryl J. Levinson & Benjamin I. Sachs, Political 
Entrenchment and Public Law, 125 YALE L.J. 400, 407–08 (2015).  
 52.  Posner & Vermeule, supra note 5, at 1671, 1695, 1705. 
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whether a statute or legislative rule entrenches the policy status quo but how 
much it does so. 
The answer depends on the deference shown by a later Congress. In theory, 
the majority in every new Congress could sweep aside all the statutes and 
legislative rules put in place by earlier Congresses; in practice, new majorities 
leave almost all such statutes and rules in place. The reasons for doing so usually 
have nothing to do with attempts by earlier Congresses to entrench their work. 
Each new Congress has little time to pursue its legislative agenda, and the status 
quo normally provides a tolerable basis from which to make the desired policy 
interventions. But even when an earlier Congress has purported to prescribe an 
outcome for a later Congress, the “bindingess” of the earlier action depends only 
on the extent to which the later Congress treats itself as bound by that action. 
Consider several statutes and rules put in place for the purpose of favoring 
the status quo. In 1871, Congress ended the practice of making treaties with 
Native American tribes; it did so by means of a statute that purported to bind 
future Congresses. Section 1 of the Appropriations Act of March 3, 1871 provides 
that “hereafter no Indian nation or tribe within the territory of the United States 
shall be acknowledged or recognized as an independent nation, tribe, or power 
with whom the United States may contract by treaty.”53 The reason for the 
prohibition was the House’s resentment of the Senate’s outsized role in setting 
Native American policy through its exclusive power to ratify treaties.54 Although 
the prohibition undoubtedly is not binding, each subsequent Congress has 
honored it.55 The entrenchment here derives from the willingness of later 
Congresses to treat themselves as though they were bound by the earlier 
Congress. 
In other cases, Congress attempts to anchor the status quo by stipulating 
particular consequences for the action or the inaction of a subsequent Congress. 
Consider the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 (commonly 
known as the “Base Closure and Realignment Act”).56 Near the end of the Cold 
War, Congress determined that the United States had too many domestic military 
facilities but found that closing specific facilities was politically difficult.57 The 
Base Closure and Realignment Act establishes a process under which the 
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission reviews recommendations 
of the Defense Secretary for facility closures and then submits its own 
recommendations to the President.58 The President, upon approving the 
recommendations, presents them to Congress.59 Unless Congress formally rejects 
 
 53.  Indian Appropriations Act of 1871, ch. 120, §1, 16 Stat. 544, 566. 
 54.  See FELIX S. COHEN’S HANDBOOK ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 74–75 (Newton et al. eds., 2005). 
 55.  Id. at 75. 
 56.  National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991, 10 U.S.C. §§ 2901–26 (1990). 
 57.  Edwin R. Render, The Privatization of a Military Installation: A Misapplication of the Base 
Closure and Realignment Act, 44 NAVAL L. REV. 245, 245, 250–51 (1997). 
 58.  10 U.S.C §§ 2903(c)–(d), 2914(a)–(d).  
 59.  Id. §§ 2903(e), 2904, 2908, 2914(e).  
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them within 45 days, the recommendations have the force of law.60 The Base 
Closure and Realignment Act was passed by the 101st Congress but prescribed 
policy outcomes for the 102nd, 103rd, and 104th Congresses. Although those 
subsequent Congresses could have voted to override the statute, it exerted a clear 
pull on policymaking. The 102nd, 103rd, and 104th Congresses dutifully followed 
the procedures laid down by the 101st Congress. Again, it is the deference of the 
later Congresses that effects entrenchment. 
Senate Rule XXII.2 also has entrenching effects. That rule imposes a three-
fifths supermajority requirement to invoke cloture for any pending measure, 
other than a measure to amend the Senate Rules, and imposes a two-thirds 
supermajority requirement to invoke cloture for any measure to amend the 
Senate Rules. On its face, Senate Rule XXII.2 entrenches the three-fifths 
supermajority requirement for cloture by setting a two-thirds supermajority 
requirement to bring any change to the three-fifths requirement to a vote. For 
this reason, legal scholars have cited it as the pre-eminent example of hard 
entrenchment.61 But the two-thirds requirement in fact binds a current Senate 
majority only to the extent that the current majority treats itself as bound. During 
the second half of the twentieth century, the president of the Senate opined more 
than once that a simple majority can set aside the two-thirds requirement, and 
the Senate in 1975 actually (although briefly) upheld a parliamentary ruling to 
that effect by a simple majority vote.62 The Senate removed all doubt on the issue 
when, twice in the last five years, simple majorities set aside the two-thirds 
requirement in order to amend the rules for debate on presidential nominations.63 
Thus, adherence to Senate Rule XXII.2 is a function of deference, rather than 
the actual bindingness of the two-thirds requirement. 
Legislation aimed at controlling federal budget deficits has been less 
entrenching. More than thirty years ago, Congress passed the Balanced Budget 
and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (generally known as the “Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings Act”).64 The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act set out specific 
deficit-reduction targets and provided for automatic spending cuts if Congress 
failed to meet those targets.65 Five years later, the Budget Enforcement Act of 
1990 amended the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act to set limits on discretionary 
 
 60.  Id. §§ 2904, 2908, 2914(e).  
 61.  See, e.g., Eule, supra note 4, at 410. 
 62.  John C. Roberts, Majority Voting in Congress: Further Notes on the Constitutionality of the 
Senate Cloture Rule, 20 J.L. & POL. 505, 514–18 (2004).  
 63.  Ed O’Keefe & Sean Sullivan, Senate Republicans Go “Nuclear,” Pave the Way for Gorsuch 
Confirmation to Supreme Court, WASH. POST, Apr. 7, 2017; Jeremy W. Peters, In Landmark Vote, Senate 
Limits Use of the Filibuster, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2013.  
 64.  Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-177, 99 Stat. 1037 
(1985). The U.S. Supreme Court declared the original version of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act 
unconstitutional for reasons unrelated to legislative entrenchment. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 736 
(1986). Congress re-enacted a modified version of the statute through the Balanced Budget and 
Emergency Deficit Control Reaffirmation Act of 1987. Pub. L. No. 100-119, 101 Stat. 754 (1987).  
 65.  MEGAN SUZANNE LYNCH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41965 STATUTORY BUDGET 
CONTROLS IN EFFECT BETWEEN 1985 AND 2002, at 1–8 (2011).  
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spending and to impose “pay-as-you-go” (PAYGO) requirements, under which 
any new spending or tax decreases had to be offset in full.66 More recently, the 
Budget Control Act of 2011 resurrected the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings approach 
of imposing automatic spending cuts if discretionary federal spending exceeded 
specific spending caps.67 
All three statutes were intended to have entrenching effects. In each case, the 
enacting Congress provided specific consequences if its successors enacted (or 
failed to enact) federal budget legislation. But, again, the entrenchment is soft 
because the mandates of all three statutes are subject to override by majority 
vote. Congress set aside the strictures of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act and 
the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 several times during the 1980s and the 
1990s. And the Budget Control Act of 2011 certainly erected no meaningful 
obstacles in subsequent Congresses. For fiscal years 2014, 2015, 2016, and 2017, 
Congress relaxed the spending caps, first through the Bipartisan Budget Act of 
201368 and then through the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015.69 In February of 2018, 
Congress relaxed the spending caps for fiscal years 2018 and 2019 as well.70 
Even Congressional action purporting to provide for hard entrenchment 
would bind a later Congress only to the extent that the later Congress treated 
itself as bound. Consider again the hypothetical example of the 112th Congress, 
in passing the Budget Control Act of 2011, purporting to prohibit any later 
Congress from repealing or modifying the spending-cap and sequestration 
provisions. As shown in Part II, that ostensible hard entrenchment would come 
up short. The constitutional processes for federal legislation give Congress the 
ultimate authority to determine what constitutes enactment of a law. Thus, a later 
statute that repealed or modified the spending-cap and sequestration provisions 
would be valid as long as the enacting Congress declared it valid. That said, the 
prohibition from the earlier Congress could have soft-entrenching effects on later 
Congresses. 
The claim here is limited but important: in practice, actual legislative 
entrenchment is soft entrenchment, and soft entrenchment is a matter of degree. 
The hard entrenchment that preoccupies the conventional analysis is more 
theoretical than real. But even if a legislative majority cannot be strictly bound 
by its predecessor, different exercises of legislative authority can have different 
entrenching effects. Congress has been more willing to work around the Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings Act and the Budget Control Act of 2011 than the prohibition 
on Native American treaties, the Base Closure and Realignment, or (until 
recently) Senate Rule XXII.2. These statutes and legislative rules represent 
 
 66.  Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388 (1990). See 
LYNCH, supra note 65, at 8–12. 
 67.  Budget Control Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112–25, §251A, 125 Stat. 240, 256 (2011). 
 68.  Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113–67, 127 Stat. 1165 (2013). 
 69.  Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114–74, 129 Stat. 584 (2015). 
 70.  Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-123, 132 Stat. 64 (2018). 
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different points on a continuum of soft entrenchment.71 
Because fiscal-policy entrenchment—particularly regarding the budget 
deficit—has been extraordinarily weak, it follows that Congress generally must 
not want to consider itself bound by earlier Congresses in this area. This is not 
for lack of effort by the earlier Congresses. In 1985, 1990, and 2011, Congress 
enacted legislation to reduce long-term budget deficits by setting out specific 
consequences in the event of certain action or inaction by a later Congress. In all 
three cases, the legislation was the product of intense and prolonged negotiations 
involving both political parties, both legislative chambers, and both political 
branches. The critical failure each time was the unwillingness of the later 
Congresses to live with the fiscal-policy outcomes provided by the earlier 
Congress. 
B. Incidental Soft Entrenchment 
The academic debate over hard entrenchment is a sideshow; the real action is 
with soft entrenchment. As shown above, statutes and legislative rules intended 
to effect entrenchment work only to the extent that a later Congress chooses to 
consider itself bound by an earlier Congress. Consequently, the entrenching 
effects of such statutes and rules vary widely, with legislation to control federal 
budget deficits having proved especially weak. But more meaningful 
entrenchment often results not from deliberate efforts to entrench a specific 
policy outcome but from efforts simply to organize the legislative process. 
Although ignored by the conventional analysis, the basic rules and procedures 
under which Congress organizes itself and conducts its business constitute 
pervasive, enduring, and significant mechanisms for anchoring the policy status 
quo. The entrenching effects of these legislative organizational structures is both 
general and largely incidental. Even so, they are of paramount importance, 
especially for fiscal policy.72 
The Constitution provides little detail for the organization of the legislative 
branch, so the complex internal structure of Congress is largely determined by 
Congress itself. After vesting “[a]ll legislative Powers” in Congress and specifying 
that Congress comprises the House and the Senate, the Constitution sets the 
“Quorum to do Business” in the House and the Senate at a simple majority, 
requires that the House choose a “Speaker and other Officers,” designates the 
vice president as the “President of the Senate,” requires that the Senate choose 
 
 71.  Although he does not distinguish between hard entrenchment and soft entrenchment, the 
examples discussed by Amandeep Grewal involve soft entrenchment (or no entrenchment at all). See 
generally Amandeep S. Grewal, Legislative Entrenchment Rules in the Tax Law, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 1011 
(2010). By contrast, Jonathan Choi mistakenly reasons that soft-entrenchment devices (such as 
supermajority voting requirements) are binding once a chamber has adopted its legislative rules for a 
particular Congress. Jonathan H. Choi, Tax Commitment Devices, 15 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 1, 20–21 (2014). 
 72.  Daryl Levinson and Benjamin Sachs analyze a different—and broader—type of soft 
entrenchment (“functional entrenchment,” to use their term) effected through political mechanisms. See 
Levinson & Sachs, supra note 51, 426–56. They briefly refer to entrenchment through the structures of 
legislative organization. Id. at 474, 479. 
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“other Officers, including a President pro tempore,” and stipulates that each 
chamber must “keep a Journal of its Proceedings” and must record “the Yeas 
and Nays . . . on any question . . . at the Desire of one fifth of those Present.”73 
Beyond these and similar minima, the Constitution simply states that “[e]ach 
House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings.”74 
The internal rules, norms, and customs adopted under the Rules of 
Proceedings Clause fill in the constitutional outline. In broad terms, the 
organizational structure is the same in both chambers, with three major divisions 
that track the flow of legislation: committees, chamber floors, and conference 
committees. The House and the Senate both use standing committees as the 
principal vehicle for producing legislation.75 On the floor, measures are debated, 
amended, and either passed or rejected by formal action. And ad hoc conference 
committees facilitate the resolution of differences between the two chambers.76 
These structures entrench the policy status quo to varying degrees. Most 
importantly, these structures confer agenda control on different legislative actors, 
thereby establishing veto gates in the legislative process. Because any measure 
must successfully navigate all the veto gates, the dispersal of proposal power and 
gate-keeping power among different legislators and different groups of 
legislators increases the chance that any particular measure either will not be 
enacted or, if enacted, will be modified to a position closer to the status quo. 
Assume, for example, that a member of the House introduces a bill to change 
the status quo on a specific issue. Success is not simply a matter of securing the 
support of a majority in the House, a majority in the Senate, and the President. 
First, the House committee of jurisdiction must report the bill favorably to the 
floor.77 There are veto gates here: The committee chair could keep the bill off the 
committee’s agenda, and a majority of the committee members could vote against 
the bill.78 If more than one committee has jurisdiction over the bill or if 
subcommittees have jurisdiction, the number of veto gates increases. Once 
favorably reported, the bill must be brought to the floor. There are veto gates 
there as well. The chair of the Rules Committee or a majority of the Rules 
Committee could refuse to report a rule for the bill, and the majority leadership 
could refuse to allow the bill to come to the floor.79 Once brought to the floor, 
 
 73.  U.S. CONST. art I, § 5, cl. 3.  
 74.  Id. § 5, cl. 2. 
 75.  See generally CHRISTOPHER J. DEERING & STEVEN S. SMITH, COMMITTEES IN CONGRESS (3d 
ed. 1997).  
 76.  See generally LAWRENCE D. LONGLEY & WALTER J. OLESZEK, BICAMERAL POLITICS: 
CONFERENCE COMMITTEES IN CONGRESS (1989). 
 77.  Leadership sometimes brings a measure directly to the floor without committee consideration. 
BARBARA SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING: NEW LEGISLATIVE PROCESSES IN THE U.S. 
CONGRESS 17–20 (3d ed. 2007). 
 78.  These blocking powers are not absolute. The committee could overrule the chair’s efforts to 
keep the bill off the committee’s agenda, and the Rules Committee could extract the bill from the 
committee. But those mechanisms are not commonly used. 
 79.  A majority of the full House can discharge a bill from the Rules Committee and bring it directly 
to the floor. But successful use of the discharge petition is extremely rare. Also, certain bills do not 
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both the rule and the bill itself must win majority support. 
Then, of course, the process begins again in the Senate, where there are 
parallel veto gates. The bill must pass through the committees and subcommittees 
of jurisdiction; it must be brought to the floor by the majority leader, often with 
the agreement of the minority leader (but without the need to pass through a 
rules committee); and it must win three-fifths supermajority support to overcome 
a filibuster. From there, any differences in the House and Senate versions must 
be resolved either through a conference committee or through successive 
chamber floor votes. In either case, the inter-chamber resolution process 
provides new opportunities for the conference committee, the House Rules 
Committee, the House and Senate leadership, and the House and Senate floors 
to block the bill. 
The complex, interlocking, and overlapping structures of legislative 
organization thus make it difficult to change existing policy. Consider just two 
examples—the filibuster and the committee system. The entrenching effects of 
the former are probably more salient. Under Senate rules, any senator can object 
to ending floor debate on a pending measure; in that case, debate must continue 
unless three-fifths of the senators vote for cloture. The filibuster ensures that a 
simple chamber majority cannot bring a measure to a floor vote; instead, with 
limited exceptions,80 passage of legislation in the Senate requires a supermajority. 
Although filibusters were relatively uncommon until the late 1960s, today it is 
generally assumed that a measure must have the support of 60 senators to come 
up for a vote on the Senate floor. 
The filibuster obviously entrenches the policy status quo.81 The point of the 
filibuster is to allow a minority of senators to block enactment of a measure 
favored by a simple majority and, thus, to impose a de facto supermajority 
requirement to change existing policy. Routine use of the filibuster in the 
contemporary Senate directly blocks measures that otherwise would be passed. 
But the filibuster has subtler entrenching effects as well. The threat of a potential 
filibuster induces sponsors to seek compromise on pending measures, thereby 
moving those measures closer to the policy status quo. And even when the 
filibuster does not actually prevent the passage of a measure, the filibuster slows 
the Senate’s progress through its legislative calendar. Floor debate and cloture 
votes take time, and, by expanding the consideration of any one measure, the 
filibuster prevents the Senate from taking up other measures.82 
In what may be the most infamous case of entrenchment through legislative 
organizational structure, the filibuster preserved the policy status quo on racial 
 
require a rule from the Rules Committee. But those bills, typically brought up under the unanimous-
consent or suspension-of-the-rules procedure, are almost always non-controversial measures that 
command unanimous or supermajority support.  
 80.  One important exception is that, under the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control 
Act of 1974, a budget-reconciliation bill cannot be filibustered. 
 81.  Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at 221. 
 82.  But see id. at 203.  
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discrimination for decades. Beginning with an anti-lynching measure in 1922 and 
ending with the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 
filibustering senators from southern states blocked ten civil rights measures and 
forced substantial compromise on five others.83 The southern senators agreed to 
the relatively weak Civil Rights Act of 1957, the first federal civil rights measure 
since Reconstruction, primarily out of concern that failure to pass it would 
precipitate cloture reform and facilitate more robust civil rights legislation.84 
Even so, the full chamber had to endure Senator Strom Thurmond’s filibuster of 
twenty-four hours and eighteen minutes, the longest one-man filibuster in 
chamber history.85 Seven years later, the Senate finally broke the southern 
filibusters of civil rights legislation when it successfully invoked cloture after fifty-
seven days of debate over the Civil Rights Act of 1964.86 
The congressional committee system also has entrenching effects. The House 
and the Senate both use standing committees as the principal vehicle for 
producing legislation.87 Committees historically have been stronger in the House 
than in the Senate,88 and, within the House, institutional reforms in the early 
1970s transferred significant authority from full committees to leadership, 
subcommittees, and the rank and file.89 Shorter-lived reforms of the middle 1990s 
further consolidated the power of House leadership at the expense of 
committees.90 And each committee always remains subject to the important but 
rarely used power of the floor to strip the committee of jurisdiction or to disband 
the committee entirely.91 But even at the lowest point of their institutional 
influence, the standing committees still exercise primary authority over 
legislation.92 The rules of the House and the Senate provide that each bill or 
resolution must be referred to the standing committee of jurisdiction.93 That 
committee then has the exclusive authority to report or not to report the measure 
for consideration on the floor.94 Although there are exceptions,95 normal 
legislative process makes each committee effectively sovereign over matters 
 
 83.  GREGORY KOGER, FILIBUSTERING: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF OBSTRUCTION IN THE HOUSE 
AND Senate 117 (2010). 
 84.  Id. at 120–21. 
 85.  Id. at 121. 
 86.  Id. at 122–24. 
 87.  See generally DEERING & SMITH, supra note 75. 
 88.  RICHARD F. FENNO JR., CONGRESSMEN IN COMMITTEES 147 (1973).  
 89.  DEERING & SMITH, supra note 75, at 33–39. 
 90.  Id. at 47–52. 
 91.  Id. at 10. 
 92.  Id. at 6–10.  
 93.  HOUSE RULES, H.R. DOC. NO. 114-192, X.1, X.11, XII.2 at 441–91, 539–54, 623–29 (2017); 
SENATE RULES, S. DOC. NO. 113-18, XVII.1–XVII.3, XXV.1 at 12, 19 (2013).  
 94.  DEERING & SMITH, supra note 75, at 6–10. 
 95.  House or Senate leaders sometimes bring a measure directly to the floor without committee 
consideration. SINCLAIR, supra note 77, at 17–20. Leaders occasionally change the substantive content 
of a measure after it has been reported out of committee. Id. at 20–23. And, in the House, the Rules 
Committee may extract a measure from another committee, or a floor majority may discharge a measure 
from committee by petition. DEERING & SMITH, supra note 75, 7–8. 
DORAN_PAGINATED (DO NOT DELETE) 5/3/2018 2:16 PM 
No. 2 2018]         LEGISLATIVE ENTRENCHMENT AND FEDERAL FISCAL POLICY 47 
within its jurisdiction. 
The entrenching effects of the committee system are substantial.96 The 
standing committees normally determine what measures advance to the floor, a 
power that encompasses two types of agenda control: proposal power or “positive 
agenda control”—the exclusive ability to propose a change on any issue within 
the committee’s jurisdiction; and gate-keeping power or “negative agenda 
control”—the ability to block change on any such issue. Because each standing 
committee is responsible to a greater or lesser extent for the status quo within its 
jurisdiction, the preferred policy positions of standing committees generally are 
closer to the status quo than are the preferred policy positions of the floor 
medians.97 Thus, relative to non-members, committee members have a greater 
preference for no change or incremental change rather than broader reform. 
Both types of agenda control bias legislative outcomes toward the status quo. 
By monopolizing positive agenda control, each committee pre-empts all other 
legislators from advancing legislation on issues within the committee’s 
jurisdiction.98 No matter how interested a legislator may be in making a policy 
change, the legislator simply cannot bring a measure directly to the floor; instead, 
the legislator must go through the committee of jurisdiction. If the legislator is 
not assigned to that committee, she has particularly bad prospects for moving the 
measure forward. Committees are jealous of their jurisdiction and do not readily 
surrender policy entrepreneurship. 
The chairs of the House Ways and Means Committee and the House Energy 
and Commerce Committee demonstrated these entrenching effects when they 
defeated the so-called “Pepper Bill” on the floor in June of 1988.99 The prior year, 
Representative Pepper introduced a bill on long-term home health care.100 The 
bill was referred to Ways and Means and to Energy and Commerce, the two 
committees of jurisdiction, but neither took immediate action on it.101 In early 
1988, Representative Pepper decided to end run the committees by having the 
Rules Committee, of which he was chair, attach his bill to a separate measure 
reported by the Education and Labor Committee.102 This angered Representative 
 
 96.  Although they do not cast the point in terms of entrenchment, McGinnis and Rappaport 
recognize the capacity of the committee system to frustrate chamber majorities. See McGinnis & 
Rappaport II, supra note 4, at 497–99.  
 97.  Murray J. Horn & Kenneth A. Shepsle, Commentary on “Administrative Arrangements and the 
Political Control of Agencies”: Administrative Process and Organizational Form as Legislative Response 
to Agency Costs, 75 VA. L. REV. 499, 503 (1989); Steven S. Smith, An Essay on Sequence, Position, Goals, 
and Committee Power, 13 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 151, 157 (1988). See also Dana & Koniak, supra note 4, at 
482–83. 
 98.  That said, positive agenda control is more entrenching in the House, where non-germane 
amendments are not permitted on the floor, than in the Senate, where such amendments are permitted. 
 99.  STANLEY BACH & STEVEN S. SMITH, MANAGING UNCERTAINTY IN THE HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES 131–35 (1988); Julie Rovner, Long-Term Care Bill Derailed – For Now, CONG. Q. 
WKLY., June 11, 1988, at 1604 [hereinafter Rovner I].  
 100.  BACH & SMITH, supra note 99, at 131; Julie Rovner, “Pepper Bill” Pits Politics Against Process, 
CONG. Q. WKLY., June 4, 1988, at 1491 [hereinafter Rovner II].  
 101.  BACH & SMITH, supra note 99, at 131; Rovner II, supra note 100. 
 102.  BACH & SMITH, supra note 99, at 131–32; Rovner II, supra note 100. 
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Rostenkowski and Representative Dingell, the respective chairs of the Ways and 
Means Committee and the Energy and Commerce Committee. They recognized 
the move as an attempt to usurp their proposal power, and they led the floor 
opposition to the special rule for the Education and Labor bill.103 Although the 
Pepper Bill was popular with the Democratic majority, Representatives 
Rostenkowski and Dingell blocked it from the floor, and the policy status quo 
was preserved.104 
The negative agenda control held by committees often has even stronger 
entrenching effects.105 The chair of a standing committee can kill a measure by 
refusing to bring it to the full committee, and the full committee can kill a 
measure by refusing to report it. In the House, where non-germane floor 
amendments are not permitted, failure to win committee approval is almost 
always the end of the matter. In the Senate, where non-germane amendments are 
permitted, a legislator may attempt to end run the committee by offering a 
measure as an amendment to an unrelated bill or resolution. But even then, the 
committee system exercises an entrenching pull. Committees enjoy considerable 
deference on the floor, and the committee chair’s stated opposition to the 
amendment normally carries substantial weight. Additionally, committee 
members are disproportionately represented on inter-chamber conference 
committees, making it more likely that a policy change approved over the 
standing committee’s objections will not return to the floor for final passage. 
The Senate Finance Committee demonstrated this entrenching capacity, 
again in the fiscal-policy setting, when it considered President Clinton’s first 
budget proposal. In an effort both to reduce the federal budget deficit and to 
improve the environment, President Clinton included in the proposal a broad-
based energy tax, known as the “BTU tax.”106 As a revenue measure, the BTU 
tax fell within the jurisdiction of the Ways and Means Committee and the Finance 
Committee. After making certain modifications, the Ways and Means 
Committee reported the BTU tax favorably, and the full House passed it.107 But 
the Finance Committee, at the insistence of a single senator, killed the tax. 
Senator Boren, from energy-producing Oklahoma, opposed the BTU tax; as a 
Democratic member of the committee, his vote was necessary to report the 
budget’s revenue provisions to the full Senate.108 The Finance Committee 
approved the budget proposal (by a vote of eleven to nine) only after replacing 
the BTU tax with a motor-fuels tax.109 The Finance Committee used its negative 
 
 103.  BACH & SMITH, supra note 99, at 132–34; Rovner II, supra note 100. 
 104.  Rovner I, supra note 99. 
 105.  Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at 219 n.210. 
 106.  WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 109–10 
(2d ed. 2006).  
 107.  Id. at 110–11; White House Looks for ‘Magic Formula’ in House-Senate Conference on Budget, 
BNA DAILY TAX REP., June 18, 1993, at G-4–G-5.  
 108.  Moderates Tell Mitchell to Kill Energy Tax; Revenue Offsets Remain Open Issue, BNA DAILY 
TAX REP., July 20, 1993, at G-3–G-4.  
 109.  Senate Expected to Begin Consideration of Deficit-Reduction Package June 23, BNA DAILY TAX 
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agenda control to move a pending measure closer to the policy status quo.110 
IV 
FEDERAL FISCAL POLICY 
Federal fiscal policy tends to be stable over time. Spending programs remain 
in place over long periods; tax revenues remain relatively constant as a 
percentage of gross domestic product even as marginal tax rates change; and 
many tax preferences endure for decades. Perhaps most notably, determined 
efforts to reduce budget deficits over the long run—such as the Gramm-Rudman-
Hollings Act and the Budget Control Act of 2011—dissipate in fairly short order. 
Why should fiscal policy be so entrenched, particularly against deficit reduction? 
Part of the answer lies in genuine policy preferences and political calculation. It 
must be more rewarding as a legislator to spend money than to reduce 
expenditures or increase revenues. But there is more to fiscal-policy 
entrenchment than that. Part of the answer lies in the incidental entrenching 
effects of legislative organizational structures, and that presents a conundrum for 
those who prefer a more flexible fiscal policy. The same organizational structures 
that tend to entrench fiscal policy also protect Congress from the chaos of pure 
majoritarian rule, promote the cultivation of policy expertise, and facilitate 
legislative dealmaking. In other words, there are trade-offs to consider. 
Eliminating or weakening legislative organizational structures to induce greater 
fiscal-policy flexibility would have broader institutional and policy consequences. 
A. Incidental Soft Entrenchment and Fiscal Policy 
The process set out in the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control 
Act of 1974 for enacting the annual federal budget is thick with institutional 
obstacles that frustrate efforts to change the policy status quo, and the default 
response to a failure of that process is to carry forward the prior budget. 
Additionally, a substantial portion of federal spending is not even subject to the 
budget process. Standing appropriations cover social-welfare entitlements, such 
as Social Security and Medicare, and standing rules in the tax code cover tax 
expenditures, such as the deduction for home-mortgage interest and the 
exclusion for employer-provided health insurance. Changing the status quo for 
social-welfare entitlements and tax expenditures requires affirmative action by 
Congress, but the anchoring effect of legislative organizational structures 
generally helps to keep existing entitlement and tax policies in place. 
1. The Federal Budget Process 
Begin with the budget process. The Congressional Budget and Impoundment 
Control Act of 1974 sets out a multi-stage procedure for enacting a federal budget 
for each fiscal year (running from October 1 to September 30). The President 
 
REP., June 21, 1993, at G-7–G-10.  
 110.  See ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., supra note 106, at 112. 
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submits a proposed budget to Congress.111 The House and the Senate then pass a 
budget resolution, which sets revenue and spending levels for the next five years 
or more.112 The budget resolution is not presented to the President; it does not 
have the force of law, although it does have binding effect for the House and the 
Senate.113 Acting within the constraints of the budget resolution, each chamber 
passes twelve individual appropriations bills covering various policy areas, such 
as national defense, international aid, and general governmental operations.114 
The appropriations bills are presented to the President and, once enacted, have 
the force of law. Additionally, each chamber passes authorization bills to provide 
statutory authority for the specific federal programs covered by the 
appropriations bills.115 As with the appropriations bills, the authorization bills are 
constrained by the budget resolution, are presented to the President, and have 
the force of law. In theory, this process adheres to a tight timeline: the President’s 
budget proposal is due on the first Monday of the February preceding the start 
of the fiscal year; the budget resolution is to be passed by April 15; and the twelve 
appropriations bills are to be completed by June 30.116 But apart from the 
submission of the President’s budget proposal, these actions are rarely completed 
by the statutory deadline—if they are completed at all. 
The budget process is fraught with institutional obstacles that, however 
unintentionally, favor the policy status quo. Foremost among these is the 
fragmentation of the budget into different components that, collectively, must 
run through virtually every congressional committee and win approval in 
multiple votes on the House and Senate floors. The budget resolution requires 
action by both the House Budget Committee and the Senate Budget Committee 
and a majority vote on the floor of each chamber.117 There are numerous veto 
gates here. The budget resolution must secure support from the chair of the 
House Budget Committee, the chair of the Senate Budget Committee, a majority 
of the House Budget Committee members, a majority of the Senate Budget 
Committee members, the chair of the House Rules Committee, a majority of the 
House Rules Committee members, the Speaker, the House majority leader, a 
majority of the full House, the Senate majority leader, and a majority of the full 
 
 111.  Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, § 300, 88 Stat. 
297, 306 (1974). 
 112.  Id. §§ 300–01; JAMES V. SATURNO ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42388, THE 
CONGRESSIONAL APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS: AN INTRODUCTION 3 (2016). 
 113.  Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, §§ 302(f), 
311, 312, 88 Stat. 297 (1974); SATURNO ET AL., supra note 112, at 3–4. 
 114.  Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, § 300, 88 Stat. 
297, 306 (1974); SATURNO ET AL., supra note 112, at 2–3, 12; JAMES V. SATURNO & JESSICA 
TOLLESTRUP, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42647, CONTINUING RESOLUTIONS: OVERVIEW OF 
COMPONENTS AND RECENT PRACTICES 1 (2016). 
 115.  See generally JAMES V. SATURNO & BRIAN T. YEH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42098, 
AUTHORIZATIONS AND APPROPRIATIONS: PROCEDURAL AND LEGAL ISSUES (2016). 
 116.  Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, § 300, 88 Stat. 
297, 306 (1974). 
 117.  The budget resolution cannot be filibustered in the Senate. Id. § 305(b). 
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Senate. Additionally, if the House and the Senate pass different budget 
resolutions, the competing resolutions may go to a conference committee—thus 
requiring agreement of a majority of the conference committee members and, 
once again, agreement of the House and Senate leadership and a majority of 
members on the floor of each chamber. 
The problems are similar but often more intractable for the appropriations 
and authorization bills. Each of the twelve appropriations bills originates with a 
subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee and a subcommittee of 
the Senate Appropriations Committee; each bill must pass those subcommittees, 
the full committees, and the chamber floors (including the possibility of a 
conference committee and renewed consideration on the chamber floors). The 
authorization bills originate in still more committees and subcommittees. Nearly 
all of the twenty-one standing committees in the House and the twenty standing 
committees in the Senate have authority over federal programs that require 
authorization legislation. 
Navigating these obstacles is difficult, and in recent years Congress has failed 
more often than not. For fiscal years 1999, 2003, 2005, 2007, 2011, 2012, 2013, 
2014, 2015, and 2017 Congress did not pass a budget resolution.118 For fifteen of 
the thirty-five fiscal years beginning with 1978 and ending with 2013, Congress 
was unable to pass all the appropriations bills, and for virtually every one of those 
thirty-five years, Congress passed one or more of the appropriations bills after 
the start of the fiscal year. Congress has passed all appropriations bills before the 
start of a fiscal year only four times since fiscal year 1977.119 Of course, there often 
are substantive policy disputes behind such failures, but the effects of those 
disputes are magnified both by the jurisdictional fragmentation among the 
budget, appropriations, and legislative committees and by the veto power of 
individual legislators and coalitions of legislators at each stage of the process. 
The result is a bias for the fiscal-policy status quo. In theory, the failure to 
enact a budget and to pass appropriations bills forces a radical departure from 
the status quo—a shutdown of government operations.120 But shutdowns, despite 
their political salience, rarely happen. Since the enactment of the Congressional 
Budget and Impoundment Act of 1974, there have been about eighteen full or 
partial shutdowns of the federal government, most of them lasting fewer than ten 
days.121 By far the more common response to a breakdown in the budget process 
has been the passage of continuing resolutions that generally provide for ongoing 
appropriations at or near the levels set under the most recent budget and that 
 
 118.  SATURNO ET AL., supra note 112, at 4. One or both chambers typically mitigate the failure to 
pass a budget resolution by deeming other legislation to serve the function of a budget resolution. See 
generally MEGAN S. LYNCH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44296, DEEMING RESOLUTIONS: BUDGET 
ENFORCEMENT IN THE ABSENCE OF A BUDGET RESOLUTION (2015).  
 119.  SATURNO, ET AL., supra note 112, at 13; Saturno & Tollestrup, supra note 114, at 1.  
 120.  CLINTON T. BRASS ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34680, SHUTDOWN OF THE FEDERAL 
GOVERNMENT: CAUSES, PROCESSES, AND EFFECTS 3 (2017). 
 121.  See generally id. 
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generally prohibit use of appropriated funds for new programs or activities.122 
Continuing resolutions, by design, carry forward the policy status quo.123 During 
the forty fiscal years starting with 1977 and ending with 2016, Congress passed 
175 continuing resolutions that fully or partially funded government operations 
for a total of 8,064 days—the equivalent of more than twenty-two fiscal years.124 
In short, the legislative organizational structures that shape the federal 
budget process tend to entrench the status quo. The budget resolution, the 
appropriations bills, and the authorization bills that collectively make up the 
federal budget must pass through virtually every committee in Congress—the 
same committees that put the status quo in place. Any departure from the status 
quo must navigate numerous veto gates. And when the process breaks down, as 
it often does, the preferred strategy is to enact a continuing resolution so that the 
budget status quo is held in place until the process successfully produces a new 
budget. 
2. Social-Welfare Entitlements and Tax Expenditures 
Although it often defaults to continuing resolutions, the budget process in 
theory requires Congress to revisit certain segments of federal spending every 
year. By contrast, other segments of fiscal policy—specifically, those providing 
funding for major social-welfare entitlements and tax expenditures—are not part 
of the regular budget process and are beyond the reach of annual 
appropriations.125 Any change to the status quo for social-welfare entitlements 
and tax expenditures requires affirmative congressional action that must 
negotiate the institutional obstacles created by legislative organizational 
structures. 
Consider the two largest social-welfare entitlement programs, Social Security 
and Medicare. The federal government paid out $911.4 billion in Social Security 
benefits during 2016.126 Those benefits were not subject to annual appropriation; 
instead, they were funded through a broad-based wage tax, a modest benefits tax, 
and interest earned by the program’s two trust funds.127 The federal government 
paid out $669.5 billion in benefits under Medicare Parts A, B, and D during 
2016.128 Less than half that amount, $319.2 billion, was funded through the annual 
appropriations process; the remainder was funded through a broad-based wage 
tax, a modest benefits tax, premiums charged to beneficiaries, modest transfers 
 
 122.  SATURNO ET AL., supra note 112, at 13–14; SATURNO & TOLLESTRUP, supra note 114, at 3–7. 
 123.  But see SATURNO & TOLLESTRUP, supra note 114, at 8–9. 
 124.  Id. at 19–30. 
 125.  In total, more than half of annual federal spending is outside the regular budget process. CTR. 
ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, POLICY BASICS: INTRODUCTION TO THE FEDERAL BUDGET 
PROCESS 3 (2017); SATURNO ET AL., supra note 112. 
 126.  THE 2017 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE FEDERAL OLD-AGE AND 
SURVIVORS INSURANCE AND FEDERAL DISABILITY INSURANCE TRUST FUNDS 7 (2017). 
 127.  Id. at 7–8. For 2016, there was a reimbursement of just under $100 million made to Social 
Security from general federal revenues. Id. 
 128.  2017 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BOARDS OF TRUSTEES OF THE FEDERAL HOSPITAL 
INSURANCE AND FEDERAL SUPPLEMENTARY MEDICAL INSURANCE TRUST FUNDS 10.  
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from the states, and interest on the program’s trust funds.129 Thus, $1.2617 trillion 
in spending under these two programs was not subject to review and approval by 
Congress through the annual budget process. Instead, the payments were made 
under laws enacted many years ago. 
Similarly, the federal government spends large amounts each year through 
tax expenditures, rules in the tax code providing preferential treatment for 
particular taxpayers or for taxpayers engaged in particular activities. Like much 
of the social-welfare spending under Social Security and Medicare, tax 
expenditures fall outside the appropriations process and, thus, are not subject to 
annual review and approval by Congress.130 The total spent each year through tax 
expenditures is hard to determine. One estimate puts the amount for 2015 at 
$1.399 trillion,131 but this figure is problematic. Tax expenditures have incentive 
effects that change behavior, and they interact with other provisions in the tax 
code.132 Thus, enacting or repealing a $1 billion tax expenditure would not 
necessarily decrease or increase federal revenues by $1 billion, once all the 
relevant behavioral changes and interactions were accounted for. But certainly 
tax expenditures are sizable. For 2016, the cost of excluding employer-provided 
health insurance was $155.3 billion, the cost of taxing long-term capital gains and 
corporate dividends at a reduced rate was $130.9 billion, the cost of deferring 
non-U.S. earnings by U.S. corporations was $102.7 billion, and the cost of 
deducting state and local property taxes was $31.2 billion.133 
Federal spending through social-welfare entitlements and tax expenditures 
represents an entrenched segment of federal fiscal policy. It is not that Congress 
cannot change these spending programs but that changing these spending 
programs is institutionally difficult. And changing them is difficult not because 
Congress has erected barriers around the programs with the specific intention of 
entrenching them but simply because Congress has organized itself in such a way 
as to inhibit affirmative legislative action. The structures of legislative 
organization result in an unintentional yet still meaningful bias for the status quo. 
The last major revision to Social Security occurred thirty-five years ago, in 1983, 
when the program was about to default on benefit payments.134 The last major 
revision to Medicare occurred fifteen years ago, in 2003, and that revision had 
the effect of increasing annual spending through the addition of a prescription-
 
 129.  Id. at 10–11. 
 130.  Certain tax expenditures have statutory expiration (or “sunset”) dates, and renewal of those tax 
expenditures requires affirmative legislative action. See generally JOINT COMM. OF TAXATION, LIST OF 
EXPIRING FEDERAL TAX PROVISIONS 2016–2026 (2017). For a broader analysis, see generally George 
K. Yin, Temporary-Effect Legislation, Political Accountability, and Fiscal Restraint, 84 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 
174 (2009). 
 131.  ALAN COLE, CORPORATE AND INDIVIDUAL TAX EXPENDITURES 5 (Melodie Bowler ed., The 
Tax Found. 2015). 
 132.  U.S. TREAS. DEP’T OFF. OF TAX ANALYSIS, TAX EXPENDITURES 1–2 (2015).  
 133.  JOINT COMM. OF TAXATION, ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL 
YEARS 2016–2020, at 28, 32, 33, 37 (2017). 
 134.  Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, 97 Stat. 65 (1983). 
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drug benefit.135 And prior to the enactment of the Tax Cut and Jobs Act in 
December 2017,136 it had been thirty-one years since the last major revision to the 
tax code to repeal or modify tax expenditures on a substantial scale.137 
B. The Costs of Dis-Entrenching Fiscal Policy 
There are cogent arguments for different policy positions on the federal 
budget deficit, social-welfare entitlements, and tax expenditures. The point here 
is not to argue that Congress should or should not reduce the deficit, that 
Congress should or should not reform entitlements, or that Congress should or 
should not repeal tax expenditures. But assume for the purpose of analysis that 
one simply wanted Congress to have greater latitude to change these elements of 
fiscal policy. Successful dis-entrenchment of deficit spending, entitlements, and 
tax preferences would require weakening important legislative organizational 
structures such as the committee system, internal managerial hierarchies, and 
voting procedures. That would be costly. Legislative organization has a life of its 
own—desirable in some respects and undesirable in others—that is completely 
independent of its entrenching effects. These structures provide institutional 
stability against position cycling, encourage specialization and the development 
of policy expertise, and facilitate durable agreements; consequently, weakening 
them would increase chaos on the chamber floors, degrade the quality of 
legislative information, and frustrate dealmaking among legislators. 
1. Internal Legislative Stability 
The structures of legislative organization induce stability in Congress. Begin 
with the possibility of instability. Arrow’s Theorem holds that, under 
straightforward conditions for democratic action, majority voting readily yields 
open-ended cycling among any three or more policy options.138 The theorem 
implies that, except in the uncommon case of a Condorcet winner, legislators 
must compromise pure majoritarian rule in order to avoid legislative chaos.139 
Following Arrow, William Riker demonstrated the instability of political 
coalitions and offered compelling historical evidence of manipulated position 
cycling among such coalitions.140 Charles Plott showed that, in the absence of a 
Condorcet winner, voting yields non-cyclical results only when the individual 
preferences of legislators are perfectly symmetrical,141 an extreme rarity in 
 
 135.  Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-
173, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003). 
 136.  An Act to Provide for Reconciliation Pursuant to Titles II and V of the Concurrent Resolution 
on the Budget for Fiscal Year 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017). 
 137.  Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986). 
 138.  See also PETER C. ORDESHOOK, GAME THEORY AND POLITICAL THEORY: AN 
INTRODUCTION 56–65 (1986). See generally KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL 
VALUES (1951).  
 139.  ORDESHOOK, supra note 138, at 62–65. 
 140.  WILLIAM H. RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM: A CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE 
THEORY OF DEMOCRACY AND THE THEORY OF SOCIAL CHOICE 214–53 (1982) [hereinafter RIKER I].  
 141.  Charles R. Plott, A Notion of Equilibrium and Its Possibility under Majority Rule, 57 AM. ECON. 
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multidimensional policy space.142 Richard McKelvey demonstrated that, if 
legislators vote sincerely, an agenda setter can construct a series of pairwise votes 
leading to any outcome, thereby using the voting agenda to control policy.143 
Subsequent analysis showed that even sophisticated voting imposes only loose 
constraints on the agenda setter’s ability to manipulate legislative results.144 Thus, 
the implementation of pure majority rule generally fails to produce durable 
equilibria.145 
But why, if the outcomes of social choice are inherently unstable, do 
legislative bodies such as Congress demonstrate high levels of stability?146 
Kenneth Shepsle argues that specific institutional structures anchor collective 
decision-making.147 He shows that the committee system and restrictive-
amendment procedures combine with heterogeneous preferences to produce 
“structure-induced equilibria.”148 In effect, Shepsle domesticates the chaos 
implied by rational-choice theory; he demonstrates the possibility of legislative 
stability through institutional arrangements that restrict the domain of available 
policy options.149 Shepsle’s argument has led political scientists to re-examine the 
structural features of Congress that ground stability and that affect the 
substantive content of policy outcomes.150 
 
REV. 787 (1967). 
 142.  William H. Riker, Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of 
Institutions, 74 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 432, 441 (1980) [hereinafter Riker II]; Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry 
A. Weingast, Structure-Induced Equilibrium and Legislative Choice, 37 PUB. CHOICE 503, 504 (1981) 
[hereinafter Shepsle & Weingast I].  
 143.  Richard D. McKelvey, Intransitivities in Multidimensional Voting Models and Some Implications 
for Agenda Control, 12 J. ECON. THEORY 472, 481 (1976). See also Richard D. McKelvey, General 
Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models, 47 ECONOMETRICA 1085 (1979); Norman 
Schofield, Instability of Simple Dynamic Games, 45 REV. ECON. STUD. 575 (1978).  
 144.  Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast, Uncovered Sets and Sophisticated Voting Outcomes 
with Implications for Agenda Institutions, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 49, 58–68 (1984). See also Morris P. Fiorina 
& Kenneth A. Shepsle, Formal Theories of Leadership: Agents, Agenda Setters, and Entrepreneurs, in 
LEADERSHIP AND POLITICS: NEW PERSPECTIVES IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 30 (Bryan D. Jones ed., 1989).  
 145.  Shepsle & Weingast I, supra note 142, at 504–07. See also Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry R. 
Weingast, Institutionalizing Majority Rule: A Social Choice Theory with Policy Implications, 72 AM. 
ECON. REV. 367, 368 (1982) [hereinafter Shepsle & Weingast II]. 
 146.  See William H. Panning, Formal Models of Legislative Processes, 8 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 427, 438 
(1983).  
 147.  Kenneth A. Shepsle, Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting 
Models, 23 AM. J. POL. SCI. 27, 27 (1979). 
 148.  Id. at 47–55. A “structure-induced equilibrium” is a point in multidimensional policy space with 
respect to which the only other points that could defeat that point “either can be proposed only by those 
who do not prefer to do so, or cannot be proposed at all.” Shepsle & Weingast I, supra note 142, at 512. 
The committee system and restrictive-amendment procedures are not the only institutional arrangements 
that can produce structure-induced equilibria. Id. at 513–14.  
 149.  Shepsle, supra note 147, at 47–55. See also Riker II, supra note 142, at 443–44; Shepsle & 
Weingast I, supra note 142, at 507–11; Shepsle & Weingast II, supra note 145, at 368. 
 150.  ERIC SHICKLER, DISJOINTED PLURALISM: INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATION AND THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE U.S. CONGRESS 5–12 (2001); Gary W. Cox & Matthew D. McCubbins, Theories 
of Legislative Organization, 15 APSA-CP NEWSL. 1, 9 (2004); Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast, 
Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions, in POSITIVE THEORIES OF CONGRESSIONAL 
INSTITUTIONS 10–21 (Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast eds., 1995) [hereinafter Shepsle & 
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Institutional analysis therefore implies that some level of incidental soft 
entrenchment is unavoidable. Congress must have organizational structures in 
order to function. The same institutional structures that incidentally perpetuate 
budget deficits, entitlements, and tax preferences tame the chaos of pure 
majoritarianism; weakening those organizational structures in pursuit of greater 
fiscal-policy flexibility would undermine institutional stability more broadly. At 
the extreme, maximum fiscal-policy flexibility could sharply reduce Congress’s 
ability to act at all. 
2. Quality of Legislative Information 
Legislative organizational structures also improve the quality of legislative 
information. Keith Krehbiel’s informational theory maintains that such 
structures provide legislators the opportunity and the incentives to invest in 
policy expertise.151 Krehbiel argues that legislators act under conditions of 
uncertainty about the instrumental relationships between legislative policies and 
non-legislative (“real world”) outcomes.152 The legislature therefore establishes 
certain organizational structures, such as the committee system, to mitigate the 
uncertainty. The reasoning is straightforward. Congress as a whole benefits from 
“informational efficiency.”153 But the pursuit of informational efficiency 
encounters the usual collective-action problem. Policy expertise is costly to 
acquire and, once acquired by any one legislator, is potentially available to all 
legislators. Thus, the “benefits of policy expertise will be realized only if 
 
Weingast III]. Some object that Shepsle’s thesis simply pushes the problem of instability back one stage. 
Riker posed the objection as one of inherited instability. Riker II, supra note 142, at 444–45. If legislative 
organizational structures, rather than policy preferences, induce equilibrium outcomes in a majoritarian 
institution, Riker argued, the heterogeneity of policy preferences ought to create instability when the 
institution establishes its organizational structures. Id. Levinson puts Riker’s point more bluntly: 
“Without some explanation of what stabilizes the supposedly stabilizing institutional structures, 
structure-induced equilibrium is a deus ex machina.” Levinson, supra note 51, at 682. But this problem is 
easily overstated. The underlying conundrum is the possibility of disequilibrium when a majoritarian 
institution acts in multidimensional policy space. Arrow’s Theorem does not predict cycling for decision-
making in unidimensional policy space when legislators have single-peaked preferences; under those 
conditions, a Condorcet winner regularly emerges. RIKER I, supra note 140, at 126; Riker II, supra note 
142, at 436–37. Those conditions seem the better fit for modeling the choice about whether to adopt a 
particular set of legislative organizational structures and, subsequently, about whether to retain that set 
of structures. Most legislators, even those in the minority, have more to lose from legislative chaos than 
from an organizational status quo. At a minimum, cycling and chaos jeopardize each legislator’s ability 
to participate in the pork-barrel politics that protect incumbency. Thus, when confronted with the 
straightforward choice between organizational structure and cycling, most legislators should have a clear 
preference for organizational structure. Here, the policy space is unidimensional, and structure is a 
Condorcet winner. This helps to explain the inter-temporal stability of legislative organizational 
structures, which even Riker conceded. Id. at 445.  
 151.  Cf. David P. Baron, Legislative Organization with Informational Committees, 44 AM. J. POL. SCI. 
485, 502 (2000) (explaining a theory of legislative organization incentivizing specialization by 
committees). See generally KEITH KREHBIEL, INFORMATION AND LEGISLATIVE ORGANIZATION (John 
E. Jackson & Christopher H. Achen eds., Univ. of Mich. Press 1992).  
 152.  KREHBIEL, supra note 151, at 20.  
 153.  Krehbiel defines “informational efficiency” as “the reduction of uncertainty in the course of the 
choice process.” Id. at 74.  
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institutional arrangements are such that some legislators have strong incentives 
to specialize and to share their expertise with their fellow legislators.”154 
By assigning individual legislators to specific committees with independent 
jurisdictions, Congress provides legislators the opportunity to develop expertise 
in particular policy areas,155 and by establishing and maintaining committees that 
cover the entire policy spectrum, the House and the Senate create institutional 
reservoirs of specialized knowledge.156 An individual legislator, however, 
rationally may not want to reveal policy expertise to the full chamber, 
anticipating that the chamber might exploit the expertise to the legislator’s 
disadvantage.157 Congress therefore institutionalizes certain parliamentary 
prerogatives, such as restrictive floor-voting procedures, that allow committees 
to secure outsized gains in final policy outcomes.158 These prerogatives increase 
the prospects that the committee will “credibly transmit[] private information to 
get a [floor] majority to do what is in the majority’s interest.”159 
Again, there is a trade-off to be made in the dis-entrenchment of fiscal policy. 
Weakening legislative organizational structures, such as the committee system 
and related parliamentary prerogatives, may introduce greater flexibility into 
federal fiscal policy. But it may also erode incentives for individual legislators to 
invest in the acquisition and maintenance of policy expertise and, accordingly, 
degrade the quality of legislative information. The result could be a more flexible 
but less informed fiscal policy. 
3. Legislative Dealmaking 
Legislative organizational structures also facilitate stable dealmaking by 
legislators. Distributive theory argues that legislators organize Congress to 
produce mutual benefits such as “pork barrel projects, . . . expenditures targeted 
to their districts, and policy outcomes desired by favored constituents.”160 The 
theory assumes that legislators have heterogeneous policy preferences, that few 
such preferences are held by a majority of legislators, and that legislators may 
secure gains from trade by exchanging support across different measures.161 
Because the “spot market” for trading votes presents problems of enforceability 
and long-term stability,162 legislators establish institutional structures to facilitate 
both the formation and the enforcement of deals that deliver benefits to their 
 
 154.  Id. at 64. 
 155.  Id. at 68–69. See also H.R. REP. NO. 93-916, pt. II (1974). 
 156.  KREHBIEL, supra note 151, at 66–81.  
 157.  Id. at 69. 
 158.  Id. at 90–92, 109 n.1. See also Daniel Diermieier, Commitment, Deference, and Legislative 
Institutions, 89 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 344 (1995). 
 159.  KREHBIEL, supra note 151, at 76.  
 160.  Shepsle & Weingast III, supra note 150, at 7–8. See also C. Lawrence Evans, Legislative 
Structure: Rules, Precedents, and Jurisdictions, 24 LEG. STUD. Q. 605, 608–09 (1999); Barry R. Weingast 
& William J. Marshall, The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are 
Not Organized as Markets, 96 J. POL. ECON. 132, 133 (1988). 
 161.  Weingast & Marshall, supra note 160, at 133, 136–37. 
 162.  Id. at 135, 138–42; Shepsle & Weingast III, supra note 150, at 11.  
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constituents.163 
Congress addresses the enforcement problems and the transaction costs of 
vote-trading through the committee system, which allows members to sort 
themselves according to the interests of their constituents.164 Within any single 
committee, legislators can make enforceable deals without the need to trade 
votes across separate measures.165 Additionally, each committee holds almost 
unchecked agenda control over policy matters within its jurisdiction. Distributive 
theory thus regards the committee system as “the formal expression of a 
comprehensive logrolling arrangement.”166 The committees’ parliamentary 
prerogatives strengthen this arrangement. Once a measure has left a committee’s 
direct control, floor amendments could undo intra-committee deals and resurrect 
the enforceability problems of measure-by-measure vote trades. But the 
parliamentary prerogatives stabilize legislative outcomes in favor of committee 
preferences.167 
Weakening internal organizational structures, therefore, may undermine 
legislative dealmaking. This may be desirable in part. Those interested in 
reforming fiscal policy may think that undermining pork-barrel spending is 
exactly the right path to pursue, and they may be correct. It is also possible, 
however, that such legislative deals are needed to help Congress function—that 
pork-barrel spending provides the grease that facilitates action in other policy 
areas. If legislators cannot form stable logrolling arrangements on spending, they 
may not be able to reach agreement on other matters. Again, there is a trade-off 
to be made in dis-entrenching fiscal policy. 
V 
CONCLUSION 
The conventional academic debate about legislative entrenchment centers on 
hard entrenchment, but hard entrenchment is highly improbable—perhaps 
simply impossible—under the constitutional framework for federal legislation. 
By contrast, soft entrenchment is far more common. Of particular importance for 
fiscal policy is the incidental soft entrenchment induced by the structures of 
legislative organization, such as the congressional committee system and 
institutional voting procedures. Such structures bring stability to the federal 
 
 163.  Shepsle & Weingast III, supra note 150, at 12–13; Weingast & Marshall, supra note 160, at 142–
43. See generally Barry R. Weingast, A Rational Choice Perspective on Congressional Norms, 23 AM. J. 
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Logrolling in an Institutional Context: A Case Study of Food Stamp Legislation, in CONGRESS AND 
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budget process, to social-welfare entitlements, and to tax expenditures; 
weakening those structures in order to make fiscal policy more flexible may 
compromise internal legislative stability, legislative information, and legislative 
dealmaking. 
 
